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1. PREAMBLE 
The use of shipping containers over the last five decades has radically 
changed world shipping and, in tandem with the many technological 
developments over the same period, has made it possible to transform the 
balance of world trade in a manner that has not foreseen when the first 
container shipments ─as we know them today─ took off  in the 1950s. 
In its 2009 Review of Maritime Transport, the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCDT) reported that the world throughput in 
containers for 2008 was 507 million TEU movements, corresponding to 
approximately 150 million container shipments (according to Hofstra 
University the ratio of container traffic over container throughput was 
around 3.51
Containers are now considered as a weak link in the supply chain with the 
potential to be exploited as a major security threat. Within this context, a 
number of national and international programmes and agreements have 
been drafted to limit the potential of intermodal containers for the 
transport of weapons ─or illegal substances─ that can be used to attack 
populations or public assets. Beyond this, the mere threat of such attacks 
and the consequent security backlash, has already perturbed the 
equilibrium of the container supply chain: shippers, port authorities and 
other stakeholders –although not purposely obstructive─ are wary of how 
the evolving security agenda will affect their business. 
 ). Even in spite of the economic crisis, in 2010 UNCDT reported 
a figure of 465 million container throughput for 2009. The latest figures 
from the World Shipping council report that the crisis has continued to hit 
the container traffic sector. They report that in 2010 container traffic stood 
at approximately 110 million shipments, which would correspond to a 
throughput of the order of 380-400 million individual container 
movements: hundreds of millions of opportunities to either defraud 
customs, introduce illicit cargo, smuggle people, or breach security 
protocols.  
One of the proposed paradigms for secure trade lanes consists in ensuring 
that a certified stuffed container be transported, from source to receiver, 
in such a manner that it can be ascertained that at no point during its 
transport was the container tampered with intent to generate a security 
threat at its destination. 
                                                                
1  
http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/worldcontainertr
affic.html 
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The vast number of container throughput makes it impossible to check the 
contents of every single container without massive disruption to trade. So 
how is this control to be carried out without disrupting trade? 
The ideal scenario for container shipping is one that continues to provide a 
fast, smooth-running, world supply chain whilst maximising security. Thus, 
the scope of any analysis of container security performance standards 
must, not only, consider the technologies available to promote security, 
but also how these could impact on the smooth flow of goods. To do this 
we also have to look at the economic technological and logistic constraints 
that define the container industry. 
Although there are a number of types of containers their sizes are 
standardized according to ISO specifications dating back to 1961; 
consequently, containers can be handled and transported by a one-size-
fits-all supply chain infrastructure that spans the globe.  
Shipping containers are a good example of a Network Effect that has led to  
Lock-In, whereby  a chain of events has made containerization so valuable 
to users that, to all intents and purposes, there is only one vendor product 
(the ISO shipping container) available to exporters and importers to 
transport packaged items across the globe. Changing the format of this 
locked-in  ‘product’ would appear to be very challenging ‒including 
proposals of designing new tamper-proof container made from hybrid 
composite materials. However, we should remember that just as the 
container completely changed the manner in which goods are transported, 
it is not impossible to foresee that the introduction of new technology 
could, in turn, signal the demise of the humble steel box in favour of an 
advanced transport system. In this respect, the role of the two 
technological areas of materials science and miniaturised sensors will be 
fundamental. 
The combination of the structural manufacturing  and design  flexibility of 
advanced composites, allied to the wide variety of miniaturized sensor 
technologies opens up the possibility of developing structural components 
capable of providing more than one functionality in a manner that had, 
hitherto, not been possible. For example, it is possible of including anti-
tamper diagnostics into the structure of the container by exploiting non-
structural physical properties of materials; for example, carbon fibre is an 
excellent conductor and therefore an ideal material for an antenna, which, 
if broken or damaged by malicious intrusion, will change its transmitting 
reception properties. In contrast, glass fibre is transparent to radar so that 
a panel made from hybrid (glass/carbon fibres) could provide a triple 
function both as a radar-transparent structural component fitted with an 
antenna. In addition to the material itself, the use of embedded micro 
sensors fitted with energy-harvesting, or remote energizing capacity, will 
open up the possibility of introducing hidden networked sensors with 
extended energy-source autonomy. These are the technical possibilities, 
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but, one should not forget that containers are, above all, cheap practical 
vectors for commerce. 
The development of new, more secure, container systems should consider 
the main techno-economic items and devise a solution that, not only 
provides increased tamper-resistance, but also contains economically 
beneficial buy-in features that will motivate the adoption of new container 
models by the shipping trade.     
2. SCOPE AND AIMS 
The scope of this essay covers, on the one hand the two primary 
technological considerations (materials technology and production, ad-hoc 
sensor networks deployment) and, on the other, the economic and trade 
statistics backdrop of the container industry.  
By considering these aspects‒in conjunction with the technological 
developments and policies in container security of the EU’s major trading 
partners‒ it is intended to set the backdrop to the potential innovative 
technologies in the area of tamper-proof intermodal containers.  The aim is 
to provide support to European Commission services in their policies of 
motivating the development, capability testing and evaluation of 
technologies that could meet the security performance standards in the 
container shipping industry, and in matters relating to meeting the EU’s 
international cooperation agreements on supply chain security.  
The technological scope of the this activity, as carried out at the DG-JRC in 
collaboration with relevant EC services (but here primarily DG-TAXUD) 
concerns the development of a multifunctional intermodal shipping 
container manufactured from hybrid materials ‒including composites. By 
multifunctional we mean structures that have the capacity to act both as a 
structural component and as housing for sensor devices.  
Benefitting from the ever-reducing cost of mobile communication systems, 
it is expected that ad-hoc sensor-equipped containers will, one day, not 
only advise on the security status of each of the 100’s of millions of 
container movements, but will also provide logistic and economic benefits 
that will ensure their up-take into the conservative world of container 
shipping.  
Although the general scope is geared towards developing performance 
levels and standards, in practice, these must be anchored in pre-normative 
research based on tangible applications of prototypical innovative 
technological solutions that, not only performs its primary role as a sturdy 
and commercially viable housing for the transport of goods, but one that 
also allows the relevant authorities to ascertain the security status of the 
container and its contents. 
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From the point of view of fostering technology and standards, the JRC is on 
familiar ground having participated in the past as a node between the EC 
services, standardization organizations and industrial stakeholders; thus 
within the context of the JRC’s STEC Action (41999) one of the first steps is 
to analyse the main drivers for technology development with close 
cooperation with the relevant Commission services. In the first instance, 
consultations between DG-JRC and DG TAXUD (who motivate the 
discussion in the following chapters) have served to establish the a basis 
for prospective collaboration with equivalent programmes with the EU’s 
main trading partners. 
3. POLICY STAKEHOLDERS AND TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 The main driver for the research we propose (other than the economic 
benefits that may accrue to European industry from the development of 
cutting edge container industry) are the security measures taken by the 
Member States (MS) of the European Union with regards to the security 
threats that could be hidden in any of the millions of containers moving in 
and out of Europe. Irrespective of the decisions taken by each EU Member 
State, there is a key role for the EU in various bilateral agreements taken by 
the EU and its major trading partners. The most significant of these are 
those between the EU and the USA (OJEU   L304/34-35 ratified by Council 
in 2004/634/EC) on intensifying and broadening agreement on customs 
cooperation (with particularly emphasis on sea-container transport), which 
is further reinforced by that between the EU and the People’s Republic of 
China  (OJEU L375/20-26 ratified by Council in 2004/890/EC).  
 Whereas these agreements appear to run in parallel, at a first reading, that 
with the PRC is primarily geared towards intelligence gathering, 
information exchange and customs protocols. That with the USA, however,  
appears to have an added technological basis linked to its own Container 
Security Initiative (CSI) programme ; indeed  in Article 3 of the EU-USA 
agreement it is stated  that  one of the objectives be that of ‘’supporting 
the prompt and  successful expansion of the CSI’’.  Now, whereas CSI 
includes a strong element of intelligence and automated information 
handling, it also highlights the need of using detection technology to 
quickly pre-screen containers that pose a security risk, and the 
development of, so-called, smarter, tamper-evident containers.  
More recently, in the summer of 2011, a further agreement between EC 
services and the DHS proposed, amongst other aspects, reinforcing the role 
played by technology in ensuring the security and efficiency of the supply 
chain. Importantly, the document highlighted two main aspects i) the need 
to ensure that said technologies should be as compatible as possible by 
way of guidelines and standards ii) encourage continued collaboration in 
innovation  by: 
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• “Extend and intensify the bilateral dialogue and cooperation on 
technology (including R&D, sharing best practices, opportunities for 
common certification practices, and contribution to setting of international 
standards” 
• “Continue to test technologies collaboratively such as currently available 
radiological/nuclear detection technologies, toward the goal of identifying 
those that meet internationally recognized standards and explore novel 
approaches, e.g. in relation to monitoring container itineraries” 
  
4. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF DG TAXUD 
The Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union's mission is to 
develop and manage the Customs Union and to develop and implement tax 
policy across the EU for the benefit of citizens, businesses and the Member 
States. Particular attention is given to the Internal Market, by making sure 
it functions smoothly and efficiently. 
 
The overall aim of EU Customs Policy is to facilitate legitimate trade whilst 
maintaining a level of controls guaranteeing the safety and security of 
citizens and protecting the public health, the environment, financial and 
economic interests of the Community and its Member States. The EU aims 
to cooperate with its trading partners to ensure the end-to-end security 
and facilitation of the international supply chain. 
 
The Commission adopted common risk criteria and standards for security 
and safety risk analysis  which are applied from 1 January 2011. 
The Decision contains a set of common risk criteria to be applied in the 
Member States' automated risk analysis systems in order to continuously 
screen advance electronic cargo information (entry summary declarations) 
for security and safety purposes.  
The Decision2
 
 represents the foundation for common risk management in 
the area of security and safety. Its provisions require regular and constant 
monitoring and evaluation of the criteria principally facilitated by the 
requirement for the Member States to provide to the Commission on a 
quarterly basis the results of implementation of the common risk criteria 
and standards (set of reporting requirements is part of the Commission 
Decision). The Commission currently closely monitors the implementation 
of the security and safety risk and will evaluate it on a quarterly basis.  
                                                                
2   Commission Decision C ( 2009) 2601 OF 15 April 2009, classified as EU 
Restraint. 
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Experts of  DG TAXUD (Unit B2) coordinates customs risk management 
related to international trade with third countries, enhance supply chain 
security and trade facilitation through management of the EU AEO 
programme, international mutual recognition thereof and the 
development and use of innovative technology to detect illicit cargo. 
Customs control for internal security purposes as well as consumer 
protection, health and safety purposes has been an integral part of 
customs control work at Member State level. Since the 2005 'Security 
Amendment' of the CCC in particular, the 'security and safety' dimensions 
of customs control work have also been incorporated into the customs 
union policy acquis, and is fully operational since 1 January 2011. The fact 
that the customs is constantly present at the border and has a longstanding 
knowledge of the goods moved within the supply chain, places it as one of 
the primary authority able to detect and prevent illicit and dangerous 
goods from entering into and leaving the EU. 
In practice, customs activity is that of an enforcement authority, which 
often means implementing the policy priorities of several policy areas at 
once. Therefore customs co-operation across the EU takes a range of forms 
throughout the whole EU external border, whether maritime, air or land 
border. In addition to respond to multiple types of risks, customs risk-
management and control must by nature be holistic. This includes, the use 
of state of the art data integration and management systems for risk 
analysis purposes, the application of a variety of equipment and technology 
tools for the detection of illicit and dangerous goods, sophisticated 
laboratory testing for security and safety as well as for fiscal purposes. 
Furthermore, customs carries out control at the most effective 
place/moment of the supply chain, which also requires use of modern 
audit approaches (system-based approach) and post-clearance type of 
controls. Customs thus has to use a variety of co-operation approaches, 
risk management and control working methods, techniques and 
equipment.  
The EU is convinced that a multi layered risk management approach, in 
which the use of Non-Intrusive Inspection is based on risk management 
principles, is the most effective and most efficient tool to enhance the 
security of the international supply chain without unnecessarily 
interfering with global trade 
Customs’ responsibility is no longer limited to protect the financial 
interests of the public treasury; it is now a service provider with a global 
mission to protect society and its citizens. More specifically, to ensure that 
only safe goods enter and leave the territory, that the traded goods comply 
with legal requirements in general, that they present no danger for the 
environment and last but not least, that they do not present any security 
threat.   
The use of technology and equipment to enhance effectiveness and 
efficiency of customs controls is becoming more and more important. 
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The European Commission is convinced that modern technology is one of 
the cornerstones to enable Customs to adopt modern risk management 
working methods. A comprehensive and effective multi-layered approach 
to risk management will result in increased freight screening, a reduction of 
physical inspections and a better focus on the risk associated with specific 
consignments. 
In order to attain the above-mentioned objectives, EU Customs aims to 
develop a wide application of modern technologies in the following areas:  
• Techniques for advanced and high speed data analysis; 
• Techniques for ensuring cargo and container integrity (e.g. E-seals, 
Container Security Device (CSD) and smart containers); 
• Techniques for supervision and monitoring maritime and air 
container transport (tracking/tracing); 
• Non-intrusive inspection techniques and Radiation and Nuclear 
detection equipment. 
The Joint Research Centre should play an important role to support DG 
TAXUD's policy towards the use of technology in order to enhance security 
in the global supply chain and make customs controls more effective and 
efficient. 
DG TAXUD has closely monitored two research projects called “INTEGRITY” 
and “SMART CM”. These projects tested, amongst other, the use of e-seals 
and smart box technology under the 7th Framework Programme for 
Research and Development, funded by the European Commission. Dutch, 
UK, Belgian and Greek customs participated. More information on the 
projects "Integrity" and "Smart Container Chain Management" can be 
found on the websites:  
http://www.integrity-supplychain.eu/index.php ,http://www.smart-cm.eu/ 
The EU-China pilot project on Smart and Secure Trade Lanes (SSTL) has 
completed its first phase and will continue to test Container Security 
Devices (CSDs), including e-seals, in the currently ongoing second phase 
with the participation of seven EU customs administrations (BE, DE, FR, IT, 
NL,PL,UK) and Chinese customs.  
The testing of e-seals during the first phase of the SSTL pilot project has 
highlighted the need for common customs requirements, procedures and 
standards to be established globally to ensure interoperability of these 
security devices and equality of treatment. 
DG TAXUD believes that these and similar innovative and pilot projects are 
essential to promote technological innovation to enhance security 
worldwide. 
Furthermore, an EU detection technology project group was created in 
January 2011, under the Customs 2013 Programme, to support and 
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facilitate modern customs administrations to tackle the challenges of the 
rapidly changing 21st century operating environment. This group has an 
important role to monitor very closely the development of technologies 
and innovations and evaluate the benefits that customs administrations 
can extract from its usage. 
Supply chain security should not rely on one single technology, but display 
a combination of different technologies combined with risk management 
based on reliable and adequate information. 
Unilateral security measures alone have a limited impact on security. 
International supply chains are complex in nature and, as a norm, pass 
though several countries. It is logical that a risk which is international in 
nature is addressed not only nationally but multilaterally by combining our 
resources, sharing the results of innovation and implementing together 
workable and practical solutions. 
In the years to come, the Commission and Member States will continue to 
focus on enhancing the use of modern, non-intrusive control techniques 
and technologies in close cooperation with the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission, suppliers and the Customs Administrations as the 
end users. 
5. STATE OF ART IN CONTAINER SECURITY RESEARCH 
5.1 RECENT CONTAINER SECURITY PROJECTS IN USA 
A recent study concerning technological development and research in the 
field of container security and logistics in the USA was recently published 
by MIT3
• Regulatory bodies 
. The report summarised the state of the art and technological 
trends in forty-one projects that were either activate or had just been 
completed in 2007. The report, interestingly,  lists the proposals not just in 
sequence, but in the form of a matrix structure whereby the rows are 
grouped by stakeholder :  
• Carriers and logistics providers 
• Shippers 
• Intelligent container Concept providers 
• Consortium Study Groups 
• Academia and Research 
                                                                
3 http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/38956 
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On the columns, the projects are grouped by technical initiative or concept:  
• Supply chain management (SCM)  
• Security and safety 
• Technology and level (container pallet etc.) at which the items 
are tagged 
In all, forty-one projects are mentioned spanning a wide range of 
stakeholders and technologies. 
The motivation for their analysis is based on the fact that shipping 
containers have come under scrutiny for two primary reasons. From the 
commercial side they are perceived as a key item where technology can be 
used to provide a competitive edge. From the public sector they are 
perceived as a growing security threat. The report states its main aim as 
that of compiling the multitude of technologies and organizations that 
were dealing with these issues, either for commercial interest or public 
safety, with a view to providing an overview of the various solutions and 
their potential benefits. In essence, the analysis consists of a series of 
taxonomies concerning technology, implementation issues, end users, and 
relevant initiatives planned or underway in 2007. It is worth highlighting 
the MIT report as, it would appear, that no such objective analysis has been 
performed at an EU level.  Later on, herein, the authors will suggest by way 
of example, that using publically available data, it could be beneficial for EU 
services to conduct such an analysis, at least for EU-funded projects. 
The essence of the MIT report is as follows:    
The report highlights that ‘’despite the hype and elegance” new container 
technology uptake will only work if it provides added value to the supply 
chain and, just as importantly, technology vendors should not be perceived 
as opportunists that seek to find problems for their technologies –implying, 
perhaps, riding on the security-scare bandwagon. In this sense, the report 
accentuates the need to highlight the true benefits; i.e., cost-cutting, as 
perceived by those stakeholders that are most likely to benefit: shippers 
and carriers.  
The report also highlights that there is a wide spectrum of needs between 
the different supply chain stakeholders and that it is not conceivable that, 
given the degree of specialisation of each sector, a one-size-fits-all solution 
can be drawn up from first principles. Indeed the adoption of new 
technologies could change the landscape of the supply chain, just as the 
container, itself, dramatically changed the manner of shipping goods for 
ever. 
As regards the proposed benefits, the main claims concern the fact that, 
given the increasing complexity of the supply chain, substantial benefits 
could be accrued by adapting containers to handle (i.e. gather and 
transmit) information concerning multiple handling moves, documentation 
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(the authors quote that the average container ship generates 40,000 paper 
documents per trip), customs manifesting, low cost track-and-trace of 
valuable goods. From the shippers and logistics companies’ point of view 
there would appear to be substantial opportunities for intelligent cargo 
systems to substantially change the management of the supply chain itself: 
from container pier management to optimization of container stock 
distribution (e.g. location and transport of empty containers etc.). 
Nevertheless, performance standards for security devices will not be 
welcome by industry if their cost cannot be recuperated or spread to third 
parties. Also, just as importantly, the imposition of enforceable standards 
must also be considered in the light of international agreements with the 
USA’s major trading partners. 
Following the short descriptive analysis above, a more conceptual 
visualization of the projects given in the MIT study are represented in the 
form of a social network, shown in the following pages. The scope is not to 
identify and scrutinize all the individual projects, subject areas and parties 
involved, but rather to highlight the main themes being studied and how 
they interact between each other. Above all it is interesting to see if there 
is a structure of interconnectivity linking the actions and research themes. 
The resulting network structures will then be compared to data concerning 
EU-funded projects. 
In Figure 1 the interaction of projects and project themes is seen to form a 
connected graph or network. The network is shown  by highlighting  the 
importance of the vertices (a project or a subject matter)  by calculating its 
connectivity measure of the remaining graph (see caption Figure 1).  
 The Graph in Figure 2 provides a quick overview of how the various R&D 
projects (blue discs) relate to the areas being studied (yellow discs).  The 
size of the disc indicates how many projects are concerned with a certain 
topic, or, vice versa, how many topics a given project is looking at. A total 
of 40 projects are represented addressing 33 topics. The most frequent can 
be read off simply by picking off the biggest yellow discs: hence in the USA, 
projects have concentrated on the Container itself with special 
considerations for the conveyance method, the tracking and the 
verification of custodial aspects. It would appear that, until 2007, the 
development of embedded sensors or using new materials for the 
container had not been considered by many projects. 
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Figure 1. Network view of the project connectivity of the  ‘’intelligent container initiatives’’ research and  development topics in the USA as reported by P.C 
Bryn ( MIT, 2007). The network view provides a synopsis of the manner in which the projects are interconnected. Left pane:  projects are shown as cyan 
circles the arcs pointing to the four main areas being studied: red circles on security and safety; blue on technology type; green for level of implementation 
─such as container or pallet; the pink circles concern R&D on communication protocols. Right pane:  the same network with node size proportional to number 
of connections (in and out) assigned to each node. Note how some nodes play a key central role in the network structures (see text). 
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FIGURE 2: a circular network overview of ‘’intelligent container initiatives’’ research and 
development topics in the USA as reported by from P.C. Bryn ( MIT, 2007). The circles are 
colour-coded as follows:  cyan circles correspond to project names; yellow circles correspond to 
organizations in charge of running them. The size of the circle represents its importance in the 
overall scheme.  
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In Figure 3 the network is sorted as two concentric circles: projects (outer 
circle) and subject matter (inner circle). The figure also bunches the 
projects in terms their stakeholder or subject matter grouping.  
Reading the outer graph clockwise: from 12:00 to  16:00 those projects 
conducted by –so called‒solution providers (of which there are 18); from 
16:00  to 18:00 consortium study groups (3 thereof); from 18:00 to 19:00 
academic and R& projects (of which 3); from 19:00 to 22:00 are the 
projects run by regulatory bodies (of which 10) ; from 22:00 to  23:00 
carrier’s projects (only 2), and finally from 23:00 till 24:00 are found the 
shippers projects (of which 4). On the inner face on the top left quadrant 
─in green─ projects concerning the location of the level of supply chain 
management, followed by projects on security and safety (in red), the 
technology used (in blue) and the level of implementation (i.e., container, 
pallet) in pink. 
The main point to note here is that the most salient topics concern the 
custodial and tracking aspects of the container itself. Interestingly, the 
most connected projects, i.e. those that interact most with subject matters 
are also important to other project teams, specifically Smart and Secure 
Trade Lanes, Tamper Resist, EPC Global, Dow, ACSD, MATTS and 
Cargomate and US DoD. What is not clear from the MIT report is how much 
interaction there is between these project partners, more specifically, the 
full list of participants, which would allow us to develop the graph of 
interaction of the participants, is not given. 
The overall picture in the USA is that, if one were to distinguish prescriptive 
(governmental) imposition of security standards from those originating 
from commercial interest, the intelligent container concept cannot be 
easily characterised to fit all the needs or commercial interests of the many 
actors that participate in the container shipping industry. Thus, whereas 
some companies ─especially technology providers—seek to suggest the 
need for regulation in security performance, others (those that have to 
bear the brunt of the cost with no clear strategy on how to pass it on) are 
diffident of implementing new technology unless there is a clear profit 
margin for them. The disaggregation of the many companies and roles 
plied by each of them would indicate that trying to impose an all-
encompassing performance standard will require considerable 
collaboration if a successful implementation strategy is to succeed. 
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Figure 3 USA’s intelligent container initiatives as concentric ring distributions with projects on 
outer and subject area in inner rings respectively. Size of the vertex corresponds to degree-
connectivity.  
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5.2 OVERVIEW OF R&D FP7 PROJECTS NETWORK  
The focus of our analysis here is to provide an overview of the structure of 
the R&D projects in container logistics in Europe by analysing the situation 
with regards to the FP7 programme.  
The data were obtained by searching the CORDIS data base under the ‘Find 
a Project’ tool, providing key words such as ‘container’, ‘security’, 
‘logistics’, etc. A specific list of projects whose scope was consistent with 
the themes that either included security research or technical aspects (such 
as ICT) that could be considered as security-use technology was not 
explicitly available. We found 26 projects that appeared to deal explicitly 
with container technology; however, only a small minority dealt directly 
with container security, the majority being more concerned with logistics. 
We found that a total of 321 companies or institutions participated in these 
projects; this implies that, on average, each project was composed of 12 
companies. Typically large network-type projects deal more with 
consolidation of procedures and commercial and corporate networking for 
implementation of in-house or turn-key technical solutions, rather than 
analysing and developing research programmes.  
The structure and interaction of the projects analysed can be seen in 
FIGURE 4. From the outset we can see that the interconnectivity graph 
appears to be composed of one large cluster made up from an ensemble of 
dendritic, or tree-like, structures. We also have three isolated star-like sub-
graphs composed of three projects and their corresponding partners. The 
Nodes are colour-coded according to the group to which they belong 
(project or organization) and the role they play in the network (isolated or 
key-player). The size of the vertex indicates the centrality-closeness of the 
node within the network and for this reason the three isolated clusters 
appear to have smaller node sizes. In essence we have the 26 projects 
(shown in cyan) which are connected to two groups of companies: in the 
first-case we have what could be called ‘single-project’ 
companies/organizations that appear to be appended to the core clique of 
companies (shown in pink) that link up nearly all the projects. One way of 
looking at this is that it would appear that FP7 R&D programmes dealing 
with container technology are highly centred on cliques of organizations 
with minor-stakeholder companies filling in for secondary roles. 
If one examines FIGURE 4 one can see that the single-project organizations 
(green circles) appear to be appended to the projects (blue) within a very 
hierarchical structure. This form of connectivity provides limited scope for 
collaboration between participants; it is not conducive to transfer of 
information or shared procedures such as the development of common 
standards. 
Although the projects, in themselves, may be of high quality, they will not 
be of much use to the ambitious theme of developing common, 
transnational inter-sector security performance standards. The research 
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efforts will, at best, spread slowly and at worst could remain as 
compartmentalised proprietary technology limited strictly to commercial, 
rather than societal, exploitation. 
6. THE CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE IN  USA. 
The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the  Department of 
Homeland Security  (DHO),  via the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Center has, in the period 2004-2009, allocated a number of grants to 
finance research in the area of supply chain security specifically dedicated 
to improvements in container security technology. According to the United 
States Government Accountability Office (GAO report-10-887) “The DHS 
has conducted research and development for four container security 
technology projects, but has not yet developed performance standards for 
them” .  
In view of the collaboration agreements between EU and USA for 
cooperation on supply-chain security mentioned above, and particularly 
the Joint Statement issued by the Secretary of the DHS and three EC 
Commissioners of June 2011 where attention is brought to ‘’exploring and 
deploying new technologies’’, it is worthwhile to pause and analyse the  —
apparent—status of the various R&D programmes associated to CSI. 
6.1 THE CSI INITIATIVE 
The CSI initiative includes a host of programmes concerned with border 
controls, intelligence-gathering of shipping data, pre-screening and other 
information that may be used by border controls to identify and target  
suspect containers. This programme has been active since 2002.  
In 2004, the DHS initiated an R&D effort  to develop  container security 
technologies; and here the emphasis is in deploying electronic systems 
and/or using new materials to reduce the possibility of introducing illicit 
items into the container itself.  In August 2009 Commission services were 
invited and reported —Note for the file TAXUD/C6/WVH D(2009)— on the 
Cargo Security  Technology Demonstration. The meeting was organised by 
the DHS at the Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque. The 
Commission report makes a point that , on the basis of the information 
presented to the EC services delegation,   the following points can be 
highlighted:  
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Figure 4 The structure of FP7-funded projects closely related on container research. It can be seen 
that most participants are single-project, low interaction, members attached to the various projects 
(coloured cyan). There is a group of participants (shown in light pink) that appear to gel most of the 
fp7 proposals and interact with each other to form cliques. This structure does not accelerate inter-
sectorial knowledge-spreading throughout the programme: more interconnections between green 
circles could benefit the spread of knowledge and development of common performance standards. 
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• The US was advanced enough to develop an international 
standard that, in view of the lack of funding at the EC/MS level, 
would require the EU to motivate the development of equivalent 
standards. 
• The MS delegates were concerned that no comparable funding for 
an equivalent project was available at Community level.  
• That although the security research call (FP-SEC-2010-1)  had been 
launched, and included a topic on supply chain security, it feared it 
would ‘take several years to have concrete deliverables’. 
In view of this —evolving— state of affairs as perceived by the DG TAXUD 
note, it is interesting to examine the report drafted by the US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the progress  made by the DHS-
funded programme on container security technology. The report –dated 
September 2010—provides an alternative portrayal to that given to the EC 
delegation in August 2009. The DHS has funded four  projects (see 
appendix A2 for further details)  in the period 2004-2009 these are: 
• ACSD: to develop a system to monitor and report intrusion on any 
of the six sides of (presumably standard) containers. 
•  CSD: to develop a device to detect and report on opening or 
removal of container doors. 
• To develop a Hybrid Composite Container with embedded security 
sensors. 
• MATTS:  to establish a system to track containers.   
The plan is that each of these systems is put through Phase I (laboratory 
testing) and then, if successful, Phase II (trade lane or environmental 
testing). Only if the systems pass both stages do they then move on to be 
proposed for the end deliverable; that is, Performance Standards to DHS 
Office of Policy Development for Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
Although the listed items do not constitute performance Standards per se, 
the project requirements give a good indication of what is expected of the 
technology. It is important to examine these proposals as they represent 
the first basis for a discussion on technology-sharing and development 
between Commission services (DG TAXUD and JRC) and their 
corresponding interlocutors (DHS and Scientific and Technology 
Directorate). In or order to ascertain if these projects constitute a viable 
common basis for discussion it is important to consider what the DHS 
considers to be the level of maturity of such projects and whether indeed 
the intention is to pursue further, abort or take some other action.  
At the time of publishing of the GAO report, the state of progress in 
September 2010 appeared to be as follows: 
• The CSD and MATTS systems had passed Phase I and were moving 
to Phase II. 
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• The ACSD  (i.e., the 360° counter-intrusion system)  and the Hybrid 
Composite Container appeared to have stalled. In the first case, 
the ACSD system had failed a number of tests in Phase I. The case 
for the Hybrid Container appeared to come against some technical 
and managerial difficulties and had not yet proceeded to Phase II. 
It would appear, that since then, progress concerning both the composite 
container and the sensors has taken place 
(see,   http://www.gtri.gatech.edu/media/726). Field testing on a sensor-
equipped composite system have taken place between Asian (Singapore)  
and US ports in 2011. For a more detailed description of telemetry and 
sensor performance standards see Annex2. 
6.2 USA NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
SECURITY 
On 23rd January 2012 President Obama adopted the National Strategy for 
Global Supply Chain. Subsequently, on 25th of January the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, announced the Strategy at the Davos 
World Economic Forum. 
Although entitled as a ‘National’ strategy, it is evident that any policy 
decisions adopted by USA at this level, will ultimately have repercussions 
world-wide. However, upon reading the announcement, it is made evident 
from the beginning that because the USA depends inherently on a global 
supply chain, it considers that any threats (natural or anthropogenic) must 
be considered within the context of cooperation not only with customs and 
border agencies of the USA’s major trading partners, but also with 
international organizations that will collaborate in the development of a 
more robust global supply chain.    
The strategy, which considers the supply chain as one of the major Critical 
Infrastructures essential for the USA’s economy and a critical global asset, 
presents two goals 
• Promote the Efficient and Secure Movement of Goods 
• Foster a Resilient Supply Chain. 
 
The first item, in essence, is geared towards increasing the security of the 
supply chain, whereas the second aims to develop methods that will 
increase the capacity of the system to return to normal functioning as soon 
as possible after a significant event has happened. The strategy clearly 
underlines that security should not undermine the efficiency and the 
smooth running of the supply chain. 
It is stated that, to accomplish this, the US government will, amongst other 
things: eliminate potential threats as early as possible, improve verification 
of suspect goods, upgrade the infrastructure conveyances (and here there 
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is a case for improving on current container technology), and, all in all, 
maximise legitimate trade flow.  
For the second goal, the Strategy  will increase resilience by mitigating 
systemic risk, identify special-protection assets (or critical supply chain 
nodes), introduce system redundancy‒where possible‒ and promote trade 
resumption policies and practices in order to return system to a normal 
performance level as soon as possible. 
All the above must be set within a global context, so that international 
programs are expected to evolve in logistic, technological and policy fields 
in collaboration with stakeholders involved in supply chain running. Special 
emphasis is given to information-sharing and the setting of common 
performance standards. 
In order to do this, the document provides a ‘Path Forward’ which 
highlights a number of priority areas. One of these concerns the use of 
advanced technology and research to develop and test secure cargo 
systems for all  modes of transport. Another key aspect is that the targeted 
priority areas be developed ‘’in concert with industry and foreign 
governments’’ . 
In view of these recent announcements, it would seem appropriate that -
within the context of technological developments of more advanced supply 
chain conveyance systems (of which shipping containers are central), both 
policy-making and research services from EC institutions should seek to 
develop collaboration programs with their US counterparts. 
It is of interest that whereas the announcement still maintains as a key 
target the illegal use of the supply chain as a source of insecurity for society 
at large, there seems to be a new emphasis in pointing out that the supply 
chain itself be considered as a target, and not just as a vehicle to deliver 
threats to others. Because of this, the announcement makes special 
reference to natural events that could also drastically affect the supply 
chain; for example, there is mention of two natural events that 
considerably affected the world-wide supply to the automobile 
manufacturing sector in 2011 (the Japanese Tsunami and Monsoon 
flooding in Thailand).  
For these and other reasons, it would seem appropriate that, as well as 
evaluating and developing new technologies to improve the anti-tamper 
security of conveyance systems of the supply chain, it would be beneficial 
to study the vulnerability of the supply chain itself as a highly complex 
interconnected network. Thus, adding network vulnerability research to 
that on engineering development would prove to be consistent with the 
scope of the proposed strategy; one that could fit well within the scope of 
the JRC’s activities and, hopefully, prove to be a useful tool for EC policy in 
supply-chain critical infrastructure protection.       
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7. SPOTLIGHT ON TECHNOLOGIES TO BE EXAMINED BY 
EU PROGRAMMES 
Two key technologies stand to have a significant impact on the container 
manufacturing and logistics industry. 
1. Innovative materials 
2. Pervasive sensor technology 
However, perhaps the most important aspect for future development is 
not so much the use of these two specific technologies in isolation, but 
rather the possibilities offered by composite materials ‒allied to their 
processing technologies‒ to be adapted to directly incorporate sensors  as 
part of the fabric of the structural material itself: a, so-called, ‘smart’ or 
‘intelligent’ structural element. A smart material or  component is one that, 
not only is capable of carrying a desired structural load, but one that can 
collect and process data from its environment and relay diagnostic 
information –via a network of similarly smart structures—to a central 
control unit where decisions can be made as to safety, security or logistics 
of container traffic flows. 
7.3 COMPOSITE MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY 
In a separate STEC Action document (deliverable D02.01 of the STEC 
project 2011) a guideline has been provided of the market costs and 
production capacity ─at European and global levels—of the composites 
manufacturing industry. Although there is a very wide range of costs which 
depend on the materials and processing techniques used, it can be said 
that a reasonable cost for the manufacture of composite material 
components that could used in the container industry is if the order of 4 
€/kg 
It can be shown that, to a first approximation,  fibre-reinforced composite 
containers could weigh of the order of 50% that of a steel one; however, 
given that the production costs would be of the order of 4 times that for 
steel , it was shown that the net cost of composite containers would be of 
the order of 4000€, compared to the 2000€ for steel. Composite containers 
have to make up this loss in a number of ways. In the first place by 
reducing on the running costs associated with road haulage and any other 
process where the weight of the container itself has a significant bearing 
on cost: this implies that a thorough analysis must be made of the potential 
cost both in cash and CO2-emission savings that could be achieved for 
every kilo of dead weight saved. The second aspect concerns the fact that, 
in view of the development of the aim of connecting containers into the, 
much-touted, Internet Of Things, the materials advantages of composites 
manufacturing technology (especially their low processing temperature 
etc) would suggest that the cost of rendering a container ‘intelligent’ would 
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probably be reduced for a design based on soft-embedded sensors rather 
than protruding systems attached to a hard, steel-based, structural system.  
Aside from their higher cost, fibre-reinforced composite materials, have 
one main drawback: the environmental impact of their manufacture and 
recycling. An analysis is required of the environmental cost that arises due 
to the fact that composites are, by their nature, not easily bio-degradable. 
In the first instance it would appear that the typical thermoset resins used 
for the manufacture of composites are not easily recyclable. Although 
there are now companies that claim to recycle waste from glass-fibre 
composite systems, most waste appears to end up in unsustainable land-fill 
sites.  
Having identified the technical aspects that must be revised vis-à-vis the 
development of the second generation of container structures, and having 
identified the cost analyses of weight-saving and embedded technology 
compared to the development of ‘smart’ container systems based on 
metallic containers, we come to the second main theme proposed above: 
ad-hoc sensor network development. 
7.4 AD-HOC SENSOR NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
Currently there is no paradigm for the ‘smart’ container, but at its most 
basic one can consider a system made up of a sensing device ( i.e. one used 
to detect some physical effect) connected to some sort of radio-
transmitter/receiver that allows the system to communicate with the 
outside world. If every actively-used container were to be fitted with such a 
system then, potentially, there would be of the order of twenty million 
such containers circulating around the globe. How they are expected to 
communicate between each other –if at all— plays a key aspect in the 
actual physical design of the system. Likewise, there is currently no 
paradigm for the communication protocol that said systems must have 
with their control basis; thus, for example, the system may or may not have 
the capacity to communicate with the control base at any time from any 
location on the globe with minimum time latency.  
The manner in which these systems communicate with the outside world 
defines the nature of a network, and the ties among the elements that 
constitute the network confer certain –topological-- characteristics that 
play a critical role in the vulnerability (conversely, robustness) of the 
network to keep functioning as efficiently as possible. 
Because containers are constantly moving, and because we have no way of 
predicting a container’s future trips, the ensemble of such sensor-equipped 
containers constitutes an ad-hoc network. If containers were to rely on 
their neighbours to hop information from one to the other until the 
message reaches some final destination, then the topology of connectivity 
is also in a state of flux. In a large port, container bays can extent for 
hundreds of metres and house thousands of units. In some of the mega -
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ports, extending over tens of kilometres, hundreds of thousands of 
containers are either in transit or waiting for cargo. What will happen to 
the communication channels if all these ‘smart’ containers start ‘chatting’ 
between themselves, or even, perhaps, over the internet? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Synthetic container-bay stacking profiles and sensor network connectivity topography. On the left 
frame: random stacking distribution of ‘container’ bay profile. Right frame: transceiver connectivity 
topography for sensor-equipped container bay as a function of transceiver strength and percentage of 
containers equipped with transceivers (the flat valley floor of lower right-hand corners implies full connectivity 
between sensors).  
 
These ever-changing topological configurations will place severe 
constraints on how we choose to design a communication protocol and the 
nature of the physical system (i.e. batteries, data logging etc).  
For example, we could consider the following question: How many 
randomly dispersed sensors does a bay of stacked containers have to have 
before we are assured that a single communication path to the central 
control station is established? The type of scenario is shown conceptually  
in FIGURE 5.  
Before considering the physical characteristics of the sensor and 
transceiver system capacities, or the communication protocol it is required 
to ensure optimum communication levels, this type of problem can be 
studied in a synthetic manner using basic mathematical tools. 
  
  
 
 26 
FIGURE 5 (right)  shows the kind of results that may be produced, even 
with a simple analysis4
In order to realise the concept of interconnected smart containers there is 
still a need to undertake research in the development of ad-hoc sensor 
networks that could conceivably make an in-road in the container market. 
The following issues will have to be investigated at length: 
 based on graph connectivity measurements. As it 
turns out, it is possible to establish a single connected-component network 
that can communicate (by hoping from one container to another) a signal, 
such as an intrusion-alarm, to a base station, by awakening and nudging 
information by using only a small percentage of the available containers. 
These strategies can be used to dimension the lifetime of the batteries and 
communication protocol of the containers. Hence, these basic 
mathematical models can provide very useful information to help 
dimension the physical components (and hence cost) of the sensors and 
their communication systems.  
• Development of low-cost sensors and transceivers. 
• Energy conservation in Ad-Hoc sensor Networks. 
• Methods and protocols for node-tracking in mobile container 
networks. 
• Control algorithms for geographically constrained (e.g. port, ship, 
etc) topologies. 
• Development of indefinite battery life or energy-harvesting 
systems. 
• Robustness of sensor equipment to environmental loading.  
• Evaluation of acceptable false-alarm propagation models.  
• Robustness of the network of interconnected sensors to natural 
and manmade hazards. 
• Performance and design communication protocols adaptable for 
variable-topology interconnected networks. 
There are no technological reasons why, even today, all containers could 
not be fitted with on-board sensing systems and connected to the outside 
world. Moreover, millions of such systems exist in the form of modern 
mobile telephony. The problem for a container-based ad-hoc sensor 
network would appear to boil down to cost: if the end-users are willing to 
pay for such systems there is no technical reason why hundreds of millions 
–never mind tens of millions‒ of containers could not be connected within 
a short time-frame. Unfortunately, whereas hundreds of millions of 
individuals are prepared to pay for mobile telephony networks, the same 
cannot be said about containers. Which mathematical tools are needed to 
model such a techno-economic paradigms. 
                                                                
4 D.K Arrowsmith (London University) and E. Gutierrez (JRC) from ‘’Ad-hoc 
sensors networks for secure container bays’’ preprint in preparation as JRC 
Report expected 2012. 
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Apart from the technology/cost ratios mentioned above, it is important 
that we not only understand the business model of container shipments, 
but also develop models of how to introduce the proposed new 
technologies into the existing container shipping infrastructure. In order to 
model the effects of such evolving techno-economic systems, it is required 
to implement complex systems models that can cater for the discrete non-
linear nature of container logistics.  
These mathematical approaches are essential to develop the underlying 
sensor-based technology required for the next generation of container 
technology. Applications of mathematical fields such as complex systems 
theory, non-linear time-series analysis and network analysis can deal with 
complex systems composed of discrete packages, of which the dynamics 
and logistics of  shipping containers is a good example.  
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this report we have given a brief overview of the status of container 
security research along two lines: 
• The policy framework in the EU and USA 
• The current technologies being considered for improving 
container security. 
It would appear that whereas the EU and USA have a concerted effort to 
collaborate on the area of supply chain security, their respective research 
programs in this area are markedly different in the manner in which they 
are run. Although a number of links have been established (joint 
workshops, conferences etc.) there appear to be no major joint basic 
research projects geared towards developing common performance 
standards suitable for the main parties concerned. 
From our analysis it would seem that most of the research, even those few 
projects that are ‘transatlantic’ in scope, is geared towards demonstration 
projects of –usually─ proprietary technology, which, even if technically 
very advanced, leaves little scope for extension to all potential 
stakeholders (i.e. policy-makers, customs agencies and the container 
shipping industry) 
More specifically, it would appear that both the policy and technological 
communities have not yet tackled the wide variety of needs and economic 
constraints imposed, in no small part, by the fragmented nature of the 
container shipping industry. 
In terms of the type and aspect of the research projects, there appears to 
be a major effort relating to the developing of ‘devices’ and ‘solutions kits’ , 
whereas few projects have examined abstract issues such as network 
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connectivity and communication protocol concepts, operational research 
of container movements and sensor deployment, and, perhaps just as 
importantly, the security threats introduced by the potential to connect the 
world’s container stock to the, so-called, Internet of Things.    
Another fundamental issue is Standardisation. In such a developing 
industry, where no widely accepted standards exist, the temptation is to 
borrow formats from communications systems that appear to have similar 
constraints and working environments. The fact that many applications will 
rely on radio technology certainly makes it reasonable (sometimes 
enforced) to accept standards (e.g. regarding the use of permitted 
spectrum). However, given that containers have to travel all over the 
world, how are these systems supposed to function if they contravene 
national standards? 
These and many other questions motivate the need for international 
research and standardisation cooperation agreements between the EU and 
its major trading partners. 
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9. ANNEXES 
A. ANNEX 1: SECURITY AMMENDMENTS of EU CUSTOMS 
LEGISLATION 
The so-called "Security amendments" of the EU Customs legislation were 
adopted in 20055 and in 20066
These amendments introduced: 
.  These amendments introduced the EU Risk 
Management framework, advance cargo information as well as a trusted 
trader program referred to as the Authorised economic operator Program 
(AEO). Since 1st January 2011, these amendments are fully implemented.  
• EU Customs Risk Management framework:  sets out a mechanism 
aimed at reaching an EU level of protection against commercial or 
safety and security risks through common control priorities based 
on common risk analysis criteria.   Real time information exchange 
between operational customs border points and the sending of 
alerts is ensured through the Customs Risk Management System 
(CRMS).   The EU Risk management framework is the backbone of 
the EU multilayered risk-based approach aimed at focusing 
controls on high risk cargo whilst facilitating low risk consignments 
and managing huge volumes of goods. 
• Advance cargo information:  Since 1.1.2011 advance cargo 
information must be provided to Customs for all
• Authorised economic operators (AEO):  operational since 
1.1.2008, the EU AEO program sets out a general trusted trader 
program providing customs simplifications and benefits as regards 
security and safety measures.  The AEO program constitutes a 
major component of the multilayered risk based approach 
focusing Customs' main attention on high risk consignments whilst 
expediting low risk consignments.  
 goods entering or 
leaving the EU Customs territory.   This enables Customs to carry 
out risk analysis for security and safety purposes, to detect serious 
risks prior to the arrival of the goods in the EU and to take 
immediate action, where necessary.  Advance cargo information is 
provided by electronic means and should be linked in the risk 
targeting systems. 
 
                                                                
5  Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code. 
6  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1875/2006 amending Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 on implementing provisions to the 
Community Customs Code. 
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B. ANNEX 2: Performance criteria and standards for the wireless 
communication systems for the CSI programmes 
The four in the CSI projects and their goals are outlined in Table 1.  
TABLE 1 CONTAINER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS FUNDED BY DHS S&T DIRECTORATE 
(SOURCE US  GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT GAO-10-887 SEPTEMBER 
2010) 
Project name  Key project requirements  
Advanced 
Container 
 Security Device 
(ACSD)  
• Detect container door opening, door 
closing, and door removal.  
• Detect a 3-inch diameter hole in the 
container on any six sides.  
• Detect human presence within the 
container.  
• Cost less than $175 per container trip. 
Container Security 
 Device (CSD)  
• Detect container door opening, door 
closing, and door removal.  
• Monitor the status of any seals or locks. 
Hybrid Composite  
Container  
• Composite container  
• Meet or exceed ISO requirements.  
• Sensor grid  
• Detect a 3-inch diameter hole in any six 
sides of a container.  
 
Marine Asset Tag 
Tracking System 
(MATTS) 
• Communicate a container intrusion alarm 
within 5 minutes of the alarm occurring. 
• Provide operational availability at least 95 
percent of the time. 
• Possess a power source to operate for 
30,000 hours. 
• Cost less than $175 per container trip. 
General • Provide a 95 percent probability of 
intrusion detection.  
• Provide a combined probability of false 
alarm and critical failure of 0.2 percent.  
• Possess a power source to operate for 
one trip (1,680 hours).  
• Time to detect and report a hole in the 
container   ≤ 1 second 
• Alarm Detection Latency  ≤ 1 
minute 
• Lifetime Power Source Duration ≥ 3,600 
hours 
• Continuous enabled time ≥ 1,680 hours 
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For the purposes of clarification, the following terms in the table are given7
•  “
 
as follows:  
Hole in the Container
• 
 is an opening that was not part of the 
original container design or construction, that was created during 
container monitoring, and that provides access to the interior 
volume of the container.  
Alarm Detection Latency
• E.g., time from detection of a breach by a subsystem of 
the BSD to successfully communicating the breach to the 
CSD. 
 is the elapsed time between occurrence 
of an alarm event and communication relay of alarm status. 
• Lifetime Power Source Duration
 
 is defined as the length of time 
during which no maintenance of the power source is required and 
only includes time in the armed state.  This includes enabled time 
and time from testing of the container to stuffing in a disabled but 
powered state” 
The following list of technical specifications  (again, provided by G. Bennett 
from Georgia Tech) are defined for the CSD programme for the electronic 
equipment used for the wireless sensor intrusion detection and 
communication systems.   
• Temperature:  
• Operate: -40oC to +70oC (IEC 60721-3-2 Table 1) 
• Survive: -50oC to -40oC and +70oC to +85oC (IEC 60721-3-2 
as above, and IEC 60721-3-2 Class 2K5 (modified low end 
to -50oC) 
• Thermal Shock 
• As listed in IEC 60721-3-2, Table 1, Class 2K4: 
• from 20oC to -40oC in 4 minutes maximum 
• from -40oC to 20oC in 4 minutes maximum 
• from 20oC to 70oC in 4 minutes maximum  
• from 70oC to 20oC in 4 minutes maximum 
• Humidity:  
• 95% humidity over the temperature range from -40oC to 
+70oC (from IEC 60721-3-2, Table 1) 
• Structural Vibration and Mechanical Shock Environments 
                                                                
7 Source: G. Bennett from Georgia Tech , at  Proc. of  4th  European 
Conference on Transport Logistics, 13-14 October 2011, Thessaloniki 
Greece 
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• Shock:  10-inch empty container drop & 5-inch fully-
loaded container drop (from IEC 60721-1, Table 1, Item 
No. 6.1.3) 
• Vibration (from IEC 60721-3-2, Table 5):   
• 3 m2/s3 from 10-200 Hz 
• 1 m2/s3 from 250-2000 Hz 
• Precipitation 
• Salt Mist, Rain, Impacting Water/Water from sources 
other than rain, Frost/Ice, Sand & Dust, Fungus (From IEC 
60721-1 and IEC 60721-3-6) 
• Radiation and Electromagnetic Environments 
• Radiated emissions shall not exceed the limits given in 47 
CFR Part 15 (UC FCC Rules on radio frequency devices). 
• Radiated emissions shall not exceed the emission limits 
for enclosure port type (please see Appendix B for 
specifics on enclosure ports) equipment installed in the 
bridge and deck zone of a ship or in the general power 
distribution zone of a ship, from IEC 60533, Tables 2 and 
3, consolidated in the table Table 2 below. 
 
TABLE 2 POWER CONSTRAINTS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
Frequency Range  Limits  
150 kHz to 300 kHz  80 dBµV/m to 52 dBµV/m  
300 kHz to 30 MHz  52 dBµV/m to 34 dBµV/m  
30 MHz to 2 GHz  54 dBµV/m  
Except 156 MHz to 165 MHz  • BµV/m  
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Abstract 
 
The development of new, more secure, container systems should consider the main techno-economic items and devise 
a solution that, not only provides increased tamper-resistance, but also contains economically beneficial buy-in features 
that will motivate the adoption of new container models by the shipping trade. This report provides an overview of these 
aspects within the context of EU policy and R&D programmes in this area. 
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